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Matter of A-R-C-G- and Domestic
Violence Asylum: A Glimmer of Hope
Amidst a Continuing Need for Reform
CAROLINE MCGEE*
In August 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
issued its first published decision recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA
held that a woman who had suffered horrific abuse at the
hands of her husband in her native Guatemala qualified for
asylum as a member of a particular social group. The landmark decision came after years of uncertainty regarding the
viability of domestic violence asylum claims and fourteen
years after the BIA had rejected domestic violence as a basis
for asylum in Matter of R-A-. Parts I and II of this Comment
provide an overview of asylum law and the development of
domestic violence asylum prior to A-R-C-G-. Part III discusses the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G- and Part IV argues
that, despite the BIA’s promising holding in A-R-C-G-,
amendments to the asylum regulations are still needed to
guarantee the adequate adjudication of domestic violence
asylum claims.
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INTRODUCTION
Before its August 26, 2014 decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had been silent on the controversial issue of domestic violence asylum for fourteen years.1
While other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, began to recognize asylum claims from women who were fleeing persecution at the hands of their spouses and domestic partners in the
early 1990s,2 the United States lagged behind with inconsistent and
arbitrary decisions. In 1999, however, the BIA dealt a huge blow to
domestic violence victims who hoped to seek refuge in the United
States.3 In Matter of R-A-, the BIA held that Rody Alvarado, who
had been repeatedly raped and abused by her husband, failed to
show that she was a member of a particular social group in order to

1
Molly Redden, Top Immigration Court Hands Huge Win to Battered
Women Seeking Asylum. Conservatives Freak Out., MOTHER JONES (Aug. 28,
2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/doj-immigration-court-domestic-violence-asylum-conservative-backlash (last visited Mar. 30,
2016).
2
See, e.g., Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 25, 78 (Can.); Ex
Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647, 653] (appeal taken from Immigration
Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.).
3
See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
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establish eligibility for asylum.4 The decision caused outrage, leading then Attorney General Janet Reno to vacate it and propose
amendments to the asylum regulations.5 Although Ms. Alvarado
was ultimately granted asylum in 2009 after a fourteen-year legal
battle, the BIA’s decision denying her asylum continued to influence
adjudicators for years to come.6
After the BIA’s decision in R-A- and the saga that followed, inconsistency from immigration judges created a patchwork of unpublished decisions that set no standard for adjudicating domestic
violence asylum claims.7 Further complicating the issue, Janet
Reno’s proposed amendments to the asylum regulations were never
passed.8 As a result, asylum applicants were left with very little
guidance on how to best argue their claims.
In August 2014, when the BIA published A-R-C-G-, many
hoped the court would clarify its position and set standards providing guidance for domestic violence asylum applicants. This Comment discusses the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G- and argues that, despite the promising decision, amendments to the asylum regulations
are still needed to guarantee the adequate adjudication of domestic
violence asylum claims. Part I outlines the legal requirements for
asylum in the United States and discusses the development of claims
of gender-based persecution. Part II analyzes important domestic violence asylum claims prior to A-R-C-G-. Part III examines the BIA’s
holding in A-R-C-G-. Part IV rebuts the primary argument against
4

Id. at 918.
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588–98 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000).
6
Matter of R-A-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-r (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
7
See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis
of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 125–48 (2013). Because many asylum decisions are unpublished, it is difficult to obtain information on domestic violence asylum cases.
To address this issue, the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies at University of
California Hastings College of the Law has created an asylum database with information on over 9,000 asylum cases at all levels of adjudication. See CENTER
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, CGRS Asylum Records, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/search-materials/search-our-resources (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
8
See Gerald Seipp, A Year in Review—Federal Courts Serving as “Gatekeeper” To Assure that Legitimate Claims of Persecution are Recognized by the
Department of Justice, 92 No. 39 Interpreter Releases 1821, 1822 (Oct. 12, 2015).
5
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the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G-, but argues that regulatory reform
should nevertheless be implemented. Finally, this Comment concludes that, while A-R-C-G- is laudable for finding that victims of
domestic violence may qualify for asylum, the decision itself is not
sufficient to clarify ambiguities in the law and ensure relief will be
available for those who need it most.
I. ASYLUM LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER-BASED
PERSECUTION AS GROUNDS FOR ASYLUM
A. What Constitutes a Refugee?
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs a noncitizen’s eligibility for asylum. A noncitizen may qualify for asylum if
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) or the Attorney
General determines that she is a refugee.9 The current definition of
a refugee is found in the Refugee Act of 1980, and mirrors the language of the United Nations refugee treaty.10 The Refugee Act states
that a refugee is
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.11
Based on the refugee definition, an asylum applicant must show
that (1) she has suffered persecution or she has a well-founded fear
of persecution (2) by the state or by an entity the government is un-

9

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
11
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
10
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willing or unable to control (3) “on account” of (4) a protected characteristic.12 The applicant has the burden of proof in demonstrating
that she meets the definition of a refugee and that she is not barred
from asylum relief for any other reason.13
B. Persecution on Account of a Protected Ground
Because the INA does not define what constitutes persecution,
asylum applicants must look to precedent to interpret the specific
types of harms that will be considered persecution.14 The BIA has
defined persecution as “the infliction of harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control,
to overcome a characteristic of the victim.”15 The U.S. courts of appeals have also set forth definitions of persecution. The Ninth Circuit has defined persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm
upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive,”16 while the Third Circuit has noted that
persecution “is an extreme concept that does not include every sort
of treatment our society regards as offensive.”17 The Eleventh Circuit has found that persecution “requir[es] more than a few isolated
incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.”18
If an applicant can establish that the harm she suffered amounts
to persecution, she “shall be presumed to have a well-founded fear
of future persecution on the basis of the original claim.”19 If an applicant has not suffered persecution, but fears she will if she returns
to her country of origin, then she must demonstrate that her fear is
12

Rebekah Morrissey, Avoiding the Rabbit Hole: Formulating Better Requirements for Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV.
1121, 1127–28 (2012).
13
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2013); see also Elsa M. Bullard, Insufficient Government Protection: The Inescapable Element in Domestic Violence Asylum
Cases, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1871 (2011).
14
Ilona Bray, What Counts as “Persecution” when Applying for Asylum or
Refugee Status, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-countspersecution-when-applying-asylum-refugee-status.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2016).
15
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
16
Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2000).
17
Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1223, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).
18
De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008 (11th Cir. 2008).
19
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
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well-founded.20 An applicant’s fear is well-founded if (1) she has a
fear of persecution in her home country on account of a protected
characteristic; (2) there is a “reasonable possibility” of suffering
such persecution if she were to return to that country; and (3) she is
unable or unwilling to return to, or avail herself of the protection of,
that country because of such fear.21 In determining whether an applicant’s fear of persecution is well-founded, a court will likely analyze the subjective and objective components of the applicant’s
claim.22 An applicant may establish a subjectively reasonable fear
of persecution through credible testimony and an objectively reasonable fear of persecution if a reasonable person in the applicant’s
situation would fear persecution if made to return to the applicant’s
country of origin.23
Establishing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution is not the end of the inquiry. An applicant must also
show that the persecution is “on account of” race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.24
In order to establish the required “nexus” between the persecutor’s
motive and a protected ground, the applicant must show that her
protected characteristic is “at least one central reason” for the persecutor’s motivation.25
Once the applicant has established either past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution, she must also show that relocating within her country of origin will not negate her fear of persecution.26 To determine whether internal relocation is reasonable,
20

Id. at § 208.13(b)(2).
Id. at § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)–(C).
22
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987) (“[T]he very language of the term ‘well-founded fear’ demands a particular type of analysis—an
examination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an
inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear.”)
(Blackmun, J., Concurring).
23
See id. at 456–57. See also Bullard, supra note 13, at 1872.
24
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
25
Id. at § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within
the meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”).
26
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(ii)
(applicants who “could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality” are not eligible for asylum).
21
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the asylum regulations outline various factors that adjudicators
should consider, such as geographical limitations, social and cultural
constraints, and ongoing civil strife within the country.27 Additionally, if the applicant has established past persecution, DHS can rebut
the presumption of a fear of future persecution by showing that
“[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that
the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the
applicant’s country of nationality.”28 A fundamental change in circumstances could include a change in country conditions or a fundamental change in the applicant’s personal circumstances.29
C. Membership in a Particular Social Group
Of the five statutorily protected grounds enumerated in the refugee definition, the “membership in a particular social group” category is the most controversial.30 Some scholars have suggested that
the social group ground was included because the drafters of the
1951 Refugee Convention “recognized that no list could possibly
encompass all of the reasons for which a deserving asylee might be
persecuted.”31 The social group category therefore encompasses
other distinct groups that might be targeted for persecution.32
Part of the controversy surrounding the social group category
arises due to the fact that the circuit courts of appeals use different

27

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3) (“[A]djudicators should consider, but are not
limited to considering, whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the
place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social
and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.
Those factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the circumstances of
the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be reasonable
for the applicant to relocate.”).
28
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
29
Dina Sewell Finkell, Changed Circumstances and Country Conditions
with Respect to Asylum, IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR, at *5, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202009/vol3no8.pdf.
30
See Bullard, supra note 13, at 1873.
31
Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123
YALE L.J. 2512, 2517 (2014).
32
Id.
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standards to decide what constitutes a social group.33 The BIA, however, has established a two-prong test to evaluate whether a group
meets the requirements for a particular social group. First, the group
must be comprised of individuals who share a common, immutable
characteristic that they cannot change or that is so fundamental to
their identity that they should not be required to change it.34 Second,
the group must be recognizable and distinct in society.35
In 1985, the BIA attempted to clarify the requirements for
“membership in a particular social group.”36 In Matter of Acosta, a
Salvadoran taxi driver who was a founding member of a cooperative
organization of taxi drivers (“COTAXI”) filed for asylum on the
grounds that he feared persecution from Salvadoran guerillas “on
account of his membership in a particular social group comprised of
COTAXI drivers and persons engaged in the transportation industry
of El Salvador.”37 The applicant testified that he had received death
threats and that three of his friends had been killed shortly after receiving death threats.38 He also testified that he was assaulted in his
taxi by three men who warned him not to call the police.39
To interpret the meaning of “membership in a particular social
group,” the Acosta court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis,
meaning “of the same kind.”40 The other grounds of persecution—
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion—describe a characteristic “that either is beyond the power of an individual to change
or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought

33

See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a “‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association,
including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or
should not be required to change it”); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir.
1991) (“Like the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated categories–
race, religion, nationality and political opinion–the attributes of a particular social
group must be recognizable and discrete.”).
34
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
35
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
36
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–35.
37
Id. at 232.
38
Id. at 216–17.
39
Id. at 217.
40
Id. at 233.
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not be required to be changed.”41 Therefore, the court found the social group category can be established where the persecution “is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”42 The immutable characteristic “must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it
is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”43 In
Acosta, the characteristics defining the social group of which the
applicant was a member were “being a taxi driver in San Salvador
and refusing to participate in guerilla-sponsored work stoppages.”44
The court found that neither of these characteristics was immutable
“because the members of the group could avoid the threats of the
guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work stoppages.”45 Construing the social group category in this manner allowed the court to “preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to
individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter
of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution.”46
In 2006, the BIA identified another consideration applicable to
determining eligibility as a member of a particular social group. In
Matter of C-A-, the asylum applicant operated a bakery, where he
became acquainted with the chief of security for the Cali drug cartel.47 Between 1990 and 1994, the chief of security visited the applicant’s bakery and talked openly about his involvement with the Cali
cartel, including events relating to the cartel’s exportation of narcotics.48 The applicant passed along the information he learned to a
friend who, as the General Counsel for the city of Cali, was responsible for investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers.49 In 1995,
the applicant was outside with his son when a car blocked their
path.50 Three men with guns attempted to force the applicant into

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 952 (B.I.A. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the car, but he refused.51 They beat him and hit his son in the face
with a gun.52 Before leaving, they told him that things would get
worse for him and that they would also go after the General Counsel.53
The applicant sought asylum on the grounds that he was a member of the particular social group of noncriminal drug informants
working against the Cali drug cartel.54 The court first determined
that having informed on the Cali cartel was not an immutable characteristic under the Acosta test because “a person who agrees to
work as a government informant . . . takes a calculated risk and is
not in a position to claim refugee status should such risks materialize.”55 The court then addressed the “recognizability, i.e., the social
visibility”56 of the purported social group. To emphasize the importance of the social visibility component, the court looked to
United Nations guidelines and confirmed that “‘visibility’ is an important element in identifying the existence of a particular social
group.”57 While the court recognized the applicant’s sympathetic
circumstances, it held that “informants are not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the Cali cartel or who
is perceived to be a threat to the cartel’s interests.”58 Because the
purported social group was not sufficiently distinct from the general
population of Colombia, the group lacked the requisite social visibility.59
Since C-A-, the BIA has attempted to clarify the social visibility
requirement. In Matter of W-G-R-, a former gang member from El
Salvador filed for asylum and withholding of removal60 on the
grounds that he feared persecution on account of his membership in
a particular social group consisting of “former members of the Mara

51

Id.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 957.
55
Id. at 958.
56
Id. at 959.
57
Id. at 960.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 961.
60
While this Comment focuses on asylum, W-G-R- is relevant because much
of the same analysis applies to withholding of removal claims.
52
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18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership.”61 The applicant testified that he was in the gang for less than
a year, but was confronted and attacked by members of the gang
after he renounced his membership.62 He was shot in the leg during
one of the two attacks he suffered as a result of leaving the gang.63
He later fled to the United States.64
The immigration judge pretermitted the applicant’s application
for asylum as untimely filed and denied him withholding of removal
on the grounds that he did not establish that he was persecuted on
account of his membership in a particular social group.65 The applicant appealed the denial of withholding to the BIA, arguing that the
social visibility and particularity requirements were inconsistent
with BIA precedent and the standards of international refugee law.66
The BIA affirmed its prior holdings that “both particularity and social visibility are critical elements in determining whether a group is
cognizable as a particular social group.”67 However, the court recognized that the term “visibility” created confusion surrounding the
requirement of whether or not a group needed to be seen by society.68 To clarify, the court renamed the social visibility element the
“social distinction” element “to clarify that social visibility does not
mean ‘ocular visibility.’”69 Rather, the element requires that the
group be perceived by society.70 The court then dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that he did not establish that former gang
members in El Salvador who had renounced their membership were
“perceived, considered, or recognized in Salvadoran society as a distinct group.”71

61

Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 211.
67
Id. at 212.
68
Id. at 216.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 222. The court did not reach the issue of whether the Salvadoran
government was unable or unwilling to control Mara 18 members because the
immigration judge made no findings on that issue. Id. at 224.
62
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D. The Origins of Gender-Based Asylum
Historically, adjudicators in the United States have generally denied gender-based asylum claims.72 Because the law does not recognize such claims in and of themselves, women who have suffered
persecution based on their gender must file under one of the five
statutorily protected grounds in the refugee definition.73 An early
gender-based claim from 1975 demonstrates the obstacles women
face when applying for asylum or withholding of removal based on
gender-specific persecution. In Matter of Pierre, a Haitian woman
filed for withholding of removal on the grounds that she feared persecution from her husband who held a position of power in the Haitian government.74 The applicant testified that, before leaving Haiti,
her husband “threatened her life and attempted to kill her by burning
down the house in which she lived.”75 She did not argue that she
feared persecution on account of one of the statutorily protected
grounds required for withholding of removal, but that her husband’s
position in the government would foreclose her from receiving protection in Haiti, “and that this in turn amounts to persecution which
the government of Haiti would do nothing to restrain.”76
The BIA denied her withholding claim on the grounds that the
persecution she suffered was not on account of her membership in
one of the statutorily protected classes.77 Instead, the court found
that the motivation behind her husband’s actions appeared to be
“strictly personal,” and therefore her claim did not merit protection
under the law. 78
Beginning in the 1990s, however, the United States began to
take steps toward recognizing some gender-specific asylum
claims.79 In 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Service

72
T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for Asylum in United
States Immigration Law and Under the United Nations Refugee Convention: Case
Studies of Female Asylum Seekers from Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia,
24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 196 (2010).
73
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
74
Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 461–62 (B.I.A. 1975).
75
Id. at 462.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 462–63.
78
Id. at 463.
79
See Twibell, supra note 72, at 197.
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(“INS”)80 issued a memorandum to asylum officers on adjudicating
asylum claims for women.81 Although the memorandum was written
only to provide “guidance and background,” the INS issued it as required reading for all interviewing and supervising asylum officers.82 The memorandum stated that “gender-related claims can raise
issues of particular complexity, and it is important that United States
asylum adjudicators understand those complexities and give proper
consideration to gender-related claims.”83
Two years later, in 1996, the BIA issued its first precedential
decision establishing that women fleeing gender-based persecution
could be eligible for asylum in the United States.84 In Matter of
Kasinga, a Togolese asylum applicant was forced into a polygamous
marriage at the age of seventeen, and, under tribal custom, would
have been forced to submit to female genital mutilation (“FGM”)
before the marriage was consummated.85 With the help of her sister,
the applicant fled Togo and ultimately reached the United States,
where she immediately requested asylum.86
After an immigration judge denied her asylum, the applicant appealed to the BIA.87 On appeal, she argued that she belonged to the
particular social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who
oppose the practice.”88 The BIA applied the Acosta criteria and recognized a social group defined in part by gender.89 The court found
80
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135)
dismantled the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). The Act
separated the former agency into three components within DHS: U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), and Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).
81
Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating
Asylum
Claims
from
Women
(May
26,
1995),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See Matter of Kasinga (1996), CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-kasinga-1996 (last visited Mar. 27,
2016).
85
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996).
86
Id. at 358–59.
87
Id. at 357.
88
Id. at 365.
89
Id. at 365–66.
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that “[t]he characteristics of being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe’ cannot be changed.90 The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the
individual identity of a young woman that she should not be required
to change it.”91 The court therefore granted the applicant asylum,
finding that she had a well-founded fear of persecution by or with
the acquiescence of the government on account of her membership
in the defined social group.92
Kasinga was praised as a crucial and momentous ruling.93 Although the decision persuaded some immigration judges to begin
granting asylum in gender-based claims,94 a decision from the BIA
three years later would create conflicting interpretations for domestic violence claims.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM BEFORE A-R-C-GA. Matter of R-AOn June 11, 1999, the BIA issued its first precedential decision
on domestic violence asylum.95 The applicant, Rody Alvarado, married her husband at sixteen years old in her native Guatemala.96
From the beginning of their marriage, Ms. Alvarado suffered repugnant physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband:
[Ms. Alvarado’s husband] dislocated [her] jaw bone
when her menstrual period was 15 days late. When
she refused to abort her 3-to 4-month-old fetus, he
kicked her violently in her spine . . . [He] raped her
repeatedly. He would beat her before and during the
90
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See U.S. Ruling on Genital Mutilation Hailed, CHI. TRIB. (June 15, 1996),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-15/news/9606150074_1_mutilationboard-of-immigration-appeals-immigration-judges.
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206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS
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unwanted sex . . . Once, he kicked the respondent in
her genitalia, apparently for no reason, causing the
respondent to bleed severely for 8 days. The respondent suffered the most pain when he forcefully sodomized her . . . One night, he woke the respondent,
struck her face, whipped her with an electrical cord,
pulled out a machete and threatened to deface her, to
cut off her arms and legs, and to leave her in a wheelchair if she ever tried to leave him . . . Whenever he
could not find something, he would grab her head
and strike furniture with it.97
The immigration judge granted Ms. Alvarado asylum, finding
that she had been persecuted on account of her membership in the
particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male dominion.”98 On appeal, the BIA
reversed the immigration judge’s decision, finding that Ms. Alvarado’s proffered social group was “described largely in the abstract” and bore “little or no relation to the way in which Guatemalans might identify subdivisions within their own society.”99 Even if
the proposed social group met Acosta’s “immutability” requirement,
Ms. Alvarado failed to show that the group was a cognizable one,
meaning that the victims of spousal abuse in Guatemala view themselves as members of such a group or that the male oppressors view
their victims as part of this group.100
Adding further confusion to its holding, the BIA attempted to
differentiate R-A- from Matter of Kasinga, finding that Ms. Alvarado had not shown that spousal abuse is itself “an important societal attribute.”101 Unlike the applicant in Matter of Kasinga, who
had shown that women of her tribe were expected by society to undergo female genital mutilation, Ms. Alvarado did not show that
97

Id. at 908–10.
Id. at 911. The immigration judge also found that Ms. Alvarado qualified
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women in Guatemala were expected by society to be abused, “or
that there are any adverse societal consequences to women or their
husbands if the women are not abused.”102
The BIA also addressed Ms. Alvarado’s argument that governments can be responsible for private actors when they fail to afford
protection.103 The court rejected the argument, however, because the
record did not establish that the actions of Ms. Alvarado’s husband
“represent[ed] desired behavior within Guatemala or that the Guatemalan government encourages domestic abuse.”104 The BIA was
cautious to note that it found the conduct of Ms. Alvarado’s husband
“deplorable,”105 but ultimately it concluded that her proposed social
group was merely a “legally crafted description of some attributes
of her tragic personal circumstances.”106 Because Ms. Alvarado had
not established a cognizable social group or a nexus between the
group and her well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA found her
ineligible for asylum.107
A year after the BIA’s controversial decision in Matter of R-A-,
Attorney General Janet Reno proposed new regulations regarding
asylum and withholding of removal claims.108 Ms. Alvarado’s case
was stayed pending the finalized regulations.109 Her case was then
reopened in 2004 when Attorney General John Ashcroft certified the
case to himself.110 At that time, DHS also filed a brief stating that
the respondent’s claim warranted asylum.111 In 2005, Ashcroft remanded the case to the BIA with order to decide the case when the
regulations were finalized.112 Ms. Alvarado waited another three
years in limbo until 2008, when Attorney General Michael Mukasey
102
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Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588–98 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000); see also Marsden, supra note 31, at 2529; Developments in Domestic Violence Asylum Timeline (1985-2010), CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
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certified the case to himself, with order to decide the case without
waiting for the finalization of the regulations.113 The BIA then remanded the case back to the immigration judge, who granted the
respondent asylum in 2009, fourteen years after she first applied in
1995.114 Unfortunately, the final grant of asylum was made by a San
Francisco immigration judge, and therefore did not produce any
binding precedent for future domestic violence asylum claims.115
B. Matter of L-RWhile R-A- was still pending on remand to the immigration
judge, another notable domestic violence asylum case was underway. In Matter of L-R-, Ms. L-R- “suffered nearly two decades of
unrelenting physical, sexual and emotional torment at the hands of
her common law husband” in Mexico.116 After abducting her at gunpoint and forcing her to live with him, he abused her on a daily basis.117 The abuse consisted of rape, public beatings, threats, and an
attempt to burn her alive.118 After “numerous futile attempts” to get
help from the Mexican authorities, she fled to the United States.119
The immigration judge denied Ms. L-R-’s claim, concluding that
the persecution she suffered did not make her eligible for asylum
because her husband “beat her simply because he was a violent man,
not because of her gender or status in the relationship.”120 On appeal,
the BIA requested additional briefing in light of the recent developments in Matter of R-A-.121 As a result, DHS filed a brief stating its
113
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114

1052

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1035

official position on domestic violence asylum: “DHS accepts that in
some cases, a victim of domestic violence may be a member of a
cognizable particular social group and may be able to show that her
abuse was or would be persecution on account of such membership.”122 Ultimately Ms. L-R-’s case was remanded and DHS agreed
to stipulate that she was eligible for asylum.123 Although her grant
of asylum did not create binding precedent, DHS’s position itself is
binding on asylum officers and DHS trial attorneys.124 As such,
DHS trial attorneys are effectively precluded from making arguments that are inconsistent with the agency’s official position in the
brief.125
Despite DHS’s official position that asylum claims based on domestic violence may be viable, many immigration judges continued
to deny victims’ claims.126 Some denials were based on the applicants’ failure to satisfy other eligibility criteria, others were the result of general skepticism regarding “the viability of domestic violence as a basis for asylum under any circumstances,” and others
were due to a lack of clear guidance from the BIA.127 Whatever the
reasoning, decisions after L-R- appeared to create even more confusion for victims of domestic violence hoping to seek refuge in the
United States.
III. THE BIA CHANGES COURSE IN MATTER OF A-R-C-GOn August 26, 2014, fourteen years after denying Ms. Alvarado
asylum in Matter of R-A-, the BIA issued its first published decision
recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum. In Matter of AR-C-G-, Aminta Cifuentes suffered heinous abuse by her husband
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in her native Guatemala.128 Ms. Cifuentes’ husband broke her nose,
burned her breast with paint thinner, and raped her.129 He also hit
her in the stomach so hard that she gave birth prematurely.130 Ms.
Cifuentes contacted the police, but they refused to interfere in a marital relationship.131 When she tried to leave her husband and stay
with her father, her husband found her and threatened to kill her if
she did not return to him.132 She attempted to escape the abuse by
moving to Guatemala City, but her husband found her and convinced her to return with him by promising he would stop the
abuse.133 The abuse did not stop, however, so Ms. Cifuentes fled
Guatemala for the United States.134
Ms. Cifuentes applied for asylum on the grounds that she feared
persecution in her native Guatemala on account of her membership
in the particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship.”135 The immigration judge rejected her claim, finding that her husband abused her “arbitrarily and
without reason,” not in order to overcome the fact that Ms. Cifuentes
was a member in the described social group.136
On appeal, the BIA disagreed with the immigration judge, finding that Ms. Cifuentes had established past persecution on account
of a particular social group.137 The court analyzed the facts of Ms.
Cifuentes’ claim under the recent precedents interpreting the meaning of the term “particular social group.”138 First, the court held that
Ms. Cifuentes’ defined social group was “composed of members
who share the common immutable characteristic of gender.”139
Next, the BIA found that the social group met the particularity requirements because the terms “women,” “married,” and “unable to
128
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leave” “have commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan society,” which “can combine to create a group with discrete and definable boundaries.”140 Finally, the court found that the group was
socially distinct because evidence showed that Guatemalan society
has a culture of family violence and that sexual offenses remain “a
serious problem.”141 These factors, along with evidence of the Guatemalan authorities’ failure to assist victims of domestic violence,
were sufficient to establish that Guatemalan society “makes meaningful distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics
of being a married woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot
leave.”142 After finding Ms. Cifuentes’ social group cognizable, the
BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge to determine Ms.
Cifuentes’ eligibility for asylum.143 On remand, the immigration
judge granted asylum to Ms. Cifuentes.144
IV. A-R-C-G-: CONTROVERSY, CRITICISM, AND A CALL FOR
CLARITY
A. Controversy and Criticism
While A-R-C-G- has the potential to afford protection to women
that have escaped domestic abuse, it has sparked criticism from anti-

140
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immigration activists. 145 These activists most often base their concerns on the “floodgates” theory,146 arguing that opening our doors
to victims of domestic violence will overwhelm the system by inciting a flood of female immigrants to seek refuge in the United
States.147 In the context of domestic violence asylum, the “floodgates” argument is both unsubstantiated and unrealistic. First, the
critics of A-R-C-G- fail to recognize that domestic violence asylum
applicants face a multitude of other obstacles, both personal and legal, that prevent them from obtaining asylum. Second, neither the
United States nor other countries have experienced a dramatic increase in asylum applications after recognizing certain large groups
as potentially eligible for asylum.
1. THE FLOODGATES ARGUMENT IS UNREALISTIC
Even with the benefit of A-R-C-G-, it is unrealistic to expect that
victims of domestic violence will now travel to the United States in
“floods” to obtain asylum. The unfortunate reality is that most of
those who would be eligible for domestic violence asylum will not
be lucky enough to even reach the United States.148 Refugee expert
Karen Musalo explains the obstacles that domestic violence asylum
victims must overcome in order to escape their countries of origin:
145

See Redden, supra note 1 (“Fox News host Brian Kilmeade fumed that the
decision would allow Guatemalan women to ‘get instant US citizenship as well
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‘tens or hundreds of millions’ of women to enter the US illegally.”). See also The
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the U.S. Protect?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-guatemala-20140915story.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“Still, the United States can’t protect everyone who needs protection.”); Julia Preston, In First for Court, Woman is Ruled
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Women who would have legitimate claims for gender asylum often come from countries where they
have [few] or no rights, which limits their ability to
leave their countries in search of protection . . . .[T]hey are frequently—if not always—primary caretakers for their children and extended family. Thus they often have to choose between leaving
family behind, or exposing them to the risks of travel
to the potential country of refuge . . . .[W]omen asylum seekers often have little control over family resources, making it impossible for them to have the
means to travel to a country where they might seek
asylum.149
In addition to the personal challenges, victims of domestic violence that are lucky enough to escape their abusers must also navigate the complex immigration system in the United States. As detailed in Part I of this Note, to have a viable claim for asylum, an
applicant must establish that she suffered past persecution or that
she fears future persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group.150 She must also show that the government in
her native country was unwilling or unable to control her abuser.151
These evidentiary standards are high, considering that many women
who flee their native countries in fear for their lives likely do so
without first acquiring documentary evidence to support an asylum
claim.152
The vague and inconsistent administrative framework in place
for adjudicating asylum claims often creates another uphill battle for
victims of domestic violence seeking refuge in the United States.153
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While asylum officers can grant asylum, immigration judges, who
are appointed by the Attorney General, are responsible for deciding
the majority of asylum cases.154 Immigration judges are often appointed based on their political connections rather than their qualifications or experience in immigration law,155 and they are given
wide discretion when deciding asylum claims.156 A study conducted
by three law professors that analyzed 140,000 decisions by immigration judges over the course of four years found that the outcome
of immigration cases is often influenced by factors such as the location of the court and the sex and background of the judge.157 The
study found that female immigration judges grant asylum at a fortyfour percent higher rate than their male colleagues.158 The study also
found that a Haitian seeking refuge from political violence is almost
twice as likely to obtain asylum in New York as in Miami.159 The
inconsistencies in the judges’ decisions are troubling because of the
potential impact they could have on refugees’ lives. As one of the
authors of the study noted, “these decisions can mean life or death,

judge to immigration judge, and asylum officer to asylum officer.”); Bookey, supra note 94, at 147–48 (“To put it plainly, whether a woman fleeing domestic
violence will receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the
consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.”); Jaya RamjiNogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007) (“[I]n the world
of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in decision making from one
official to the next, from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from
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and they seem to a large extent to be the result of a clerk’s random
assignment of a case to a particular judge.”160
Statutory exceptions also create barriers for asylum applicants.161 The exceptions include a one-year filing deadline, a bar for
those previously denied asylum by an immigration judge or the BIA,
and a bar for those who can be removed to a safe third party country.162 The one-year filing deadline, which requires an applicant
seeking asylum to apply within one year of entering the United
States, can be particularly problematic for victims of domestic
abuse. Although regulatory exceptions to the one-year deadline may
apply in “extraordinary” circumstances,163 such as post-traumatic
stress disorder, they are narrowly construed.164 Other compelling
circumstances, such as difficulty accessing legal counsel or a lack
of knowledge of the relief available, would most likely not be considered “extraordinary” enough for an adjudicator to waive the
deadline.165
2. THE FLOODGATES ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PAST
EXPERIENCE
The floodgates argument is further weakened by statistics from
other countries and the United States showing that increased approval of gender-related claims does not result in a surge of such
claims. In 1993, Canada was the first country in the world to issue
“Gender Guidelines” and give protection to women that had fled
gender-related violence and persecution.166 Since then, Canada has
maintained statistics on gender-based asylum claims and reported
no increase in claims in the seven years following the adoption of
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the Gender Guidelines.167 In fact, gender-based claims consistently
constituted “only a miniscule fraction” of Canada’s total claims.168
Even in the United States, statistics have not shown a dramatic
increase in asylum claims from purported members of a particular
social group after the group has been recognized as such. One
scholar has labeled the floodgates argument “absurd,” noting that
“[t]he BIA and US federal courts . . . have recognized many broad
groups as eligible for asylum, including any Coptic Christian living
in Egypt, any Filipino of Chinese ancestry living in the Philippines,
or any gay or lesbian person living in Cuba.”169 Many of those who
opposed the decision in Matter of Kasinga predicted that millions of
women are subject to female genital mutilation every year, and that
the U.S. “would be overwhelmed with asylum seekers if it recognized fear of FGC as a basis for asylum.”170 Statistics showed, however, that INS did not see a dramatic increase in the number of asylum claims based on female genital mutilation after the BIA issued
its decision.171
A closer look at the floodgates theory shows that the argument
has little, if any, merit. It nevertheless raises an important question:
should the fear of a flood of arriving immigrants justify closing our
doors to women facing life-threatening situations? While speaking
at a recent symposium, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that “the fair
administration of justice is never cost-free.”172 In the case of domestic violence asylum, sending applicants back to countries that cannot
protect them would be unreasonable even if granting them asylum
would result in an increase in the number of asylum applications
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filed in the United States. The cost of the fair administration of justice for those fleeing domestic abuse is surely outweighed by the
benefit of a life saved.
B. A Call for Clarity: Continuing Need for Regulatory Reform
The BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- should be celebrated
for providing victims of domestic abuse with a potential path for
obtaining asylum in the United States. The decision itself, however,
is a narrow one, and it does not clarify many of the underlying ambiguities in domestic violence asylum law.173 In order to provide
clarity and generate more consistent decisions, DHS should implement the asylum regulations that were proposed by Janet Reno following the R-A- decision.
Although Matter of A-R-C-G- is an important initial step in recognizing domestic violence asylum claims, DHS should nonetheless
implement the proposed amendments to the asylum regulations to
clarify lingering ambiguities in the law.174 “The best way to solidify
the legal foundation for domestic violence asylum, reduce inconsistency in asylum adjudications, and make domestic violence asylum permanent is through the regulatory process.”175 The primary
benefit of Reno’s proposed regulations is that they provide more
uniform definitions of the terms used in asylum law, such as “particular social group” and “social visibility.”176 Importantly, the
amendments were “developed with an awareness of the circumstances surrounding persecution against women and recognize[] that
domestic violence is not only a private matter and may, under certain
circumstances, qualify the victim for a grant of asylum.”177
While the proposed amendments do not carve out any special
categories for domestic violence asylum claims,178 they do include
173
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several important changes: (1) the amendments clarify that sex can
constitute a particular social group; (2) the amendments provide that
an applicant need not prove that her persecutor was subjectively motivated to harm her; and (3) the amendments suggest that the nexus
element may be established by a showing of societal norms and customs.179 For domestic violence survivors seeking asylum, these
changes could be significant. While the A-R-C-G- court found that
Ms. Cifuentes’ proffered gender-based social group was cognizable,
the court limited its holding by noting that “in the domestic violence
context, the issue of social distinction will depend on the facts and
evidence in each individual case.”180 According to the court, supporting evidence might include “documented country conditions;
law enforcement statistics and expert witnesses, if proffered; the
[applicant’s] past experiences; and other reliable and credible
sources of information.”181 Many domestic violence asylum applicants may appear pro se, however, which would limit their ability to
obtain documented country conditions, statistics, and expert witnesses. The amended regulations are therefore needed to clarify that,
despite evidentiary requirements, sex can constitute a particular social group.
The amendments are also beneficial to domestic violence asylum seekers because they loosen the nexus requirements in the particular social group analysis. In A-R-C-G-, DHS conceded that the
abuse Ms. Cifuentes endured was, “for at least one central reason,
on account of her membership in a cognizable particular social
group.”182 The court accepted DHS’s concession and did not address
the issue other than to note that “the issue of nexus will depend on
the facts and circumstances of an individual claim.”183 As such, implementing the proposed amendments would help provide guidance
on the nexus requirement where A-R-C-G- does not.
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CONCLUSION
Matter of A-R-C-G- is a landmark decision and an important step
toward recognizing the viability of domestic violence asylum
claims. The binding precedent from the highest administrative tribunal in the United States is encouraging and will undoubtedly have
positive implications for victims of domestic abuse that seek refuge
in the United States. Nevertheless, A-R-C-G-’s narrow holding rests
against the backdrop of a confusing and inconsistent history of domestic violence asylum adjudication. The BIA’s (limited) endorsement of domestic violence as a possible basis for asylum suggests
that regulatory reform is still needed to clarify lingering ambiguities
in the law. As such, the United States should implement amendments to the asylum regulations to ensure more consistent decisionmaking in the cases of women fleeing domestic violence. Regulatory reform, coupled with the BIA’s groundbreaking holding in AR-C-G-, would provide victims of domestic abuse with meaningful
protection under United States immigration law.

